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This diploma thesis called ‘Performative Power and Terrorism in Europe in the 2010s’, deals 
with the evolution of terrorism, counterterrorism and the use of the theory of performative 
power, as coined by Beatrice de Graaf in 2010. Since the recent attacks in Paris (13th of 
November 2015) and Nice (14th of July 2016), terrorism has become a hot topic again for both 
scholars and policymakers. De Graaf has provided a schedule of fourteen signifiers in order to 
measure the performativity of authorities, and the extent to which they are capable of 
influencing public fears and opinion when it comes to terrorism. A schedule that should 
concretise the way in which theory can be ‘translated’ to practice. By means of two case studies, 
regarding the terrorist attacks mentioned above, the theory and its signifiers will be analysed. 
The result of this analysis was stunning. This paper argues the theory and the signifiers are 
partially flawed and anachronistic. Although De Graaf considers her theory to be universal, the 
research conducted in this document reveals shortcomings and proves it does not stand the test 
of time. In order to make performative power and the signifiers time-resistant it has to be altered. 
Recommendations are therefore provided at the end of this paper.  
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In a time of terrorist attacks in Western Europe (such as in Paris, Nice, Brussels, Berlin and 
London), states have to react to an increased feeling of insecurity among its citizens. It concerns 
a period that marks the beginning of counterterrorism policy in the Europe after the 9/11 attack. 
History has proven to us that despite similar threats in the cases mentioned above, the nature of 
the response to such threats is totally diverse in different states.  
Dutch counterterrorism expert Beatrice de Graaf analyses different responses within the 
‘security dispositive’ and the framework of her ‘performative power’ 1  in Evaluating 
Counterterrorism Performance: A comparative study. She uses fourteen ‘signifiers’, analysing 
both material and immaterial effects of governmental responses to terrorism, such as policy 
implementation on the part of the police, intelligence services and the judiciary. This offers her 
the chance to frame issues such as the public mind or the power of mobilising popular support 
for counterterrorism. Her research does focus on counterterrorism in the Netherlands, the FRG, 
Italy and the United States. In the end, she concludes that low levels of performative power 
from the side states can have a positive effect on all cases of counterterrorist measures (De 
Graaf, 2011:5).  
The theory of performative power and the fourteen signifiers concerns a theory at the 
intersection of political science and historical science here. The basic idea behind the theory is 
to ‘tick the boxes’, assess whether certain factors or signifiers are present or not, based on 
empirical information. This makes this theory on how to battle terrorism much more practical, 
more feasible, and less vague than other academic approaches to eradicate terrorist violence. 
Since De Graaf used four different case studies to develop her theory of performative power 
and the complementing fourteen signifiers, she covers a variety of terrorist (and therefore 
counterterrorist) strategies. An approach De Graaf therefore claims to be universal to all cases 
of terrorism, and useful to all counterterrorist policy makers. A theory that has proven its worth 
over the past decades, considering the fact it has been able to perfectly catch both public opinion, 
as well as government’s reactions after terrorist attacks, and could therefore be seen as a 
primordial instrument in developing counterterrorism policy. (De Graaf, 2011: 1). 
                                                            
1 Please note it does not concern Jean-François Lyotard’s notion of performativity in this paper. More information 




Times do however change. Is the conclusion of De Graaf, which referred to terrorism in the 
‘roaring seventies’ still valid? After all, society has changed half a century after the terrorist 
waves that De Graaf has been describing in her book. The whole nature of society has changed, 
and terrorism seems to put a bigger burden on society than in the seventies, and also the means 
for both terrorists and governments to influence the public (e.g. via social media) grew. 
Furthermore, since nobody before has tried to apply the signifiers to any other cases of 
counterterrorism policy by states, it could be useful to test De Graaf’s theory in its totality. By 
selecting two contemporary cases of terrorist attacks, this thesis hopes to find out to what extent 
the theory of performative power as coined by De Graaf is still applicable to contemporary 
cases of terrorism in Europe.  
Therefore, and given the objective of this thesis, the following research question has been 
formulated: To what extent is the theory of performative power as coined by Beatrice de Graaf 
still applicable to contemporary cases of terrorism in Europe? 
As mentioned above, the main goal is to analyse to what extent the theory of performative 
power as coined by Beatrice de Graaf is still applicable to contemporary cases of terrorism in 
Europe. It does so by analysing the French government’s reaction and changes to its CT policy 
after the Paris and Nice attacks, according to the fourteen signifiers developed by De Graaf. 
This paper will test this theory of performative power and the fourteen signifiers; do the 
signifiers still function in today’s circumstances when it comes to counterterrorism? Should 
factors be added, deleted, or maybe altered? In short, what works, and what does not work? In 
this way, I am aiming to find out more about De Graaf’s theory’s feasibility these days.  
Moreover, this thesis will have a look at some of the conclusions De Graaf is drawing based on 
her own work back in 2010. Several of these conclusions might look obvious, others do not, 
but all of them are based on the theory that will be under scrutiny in this paper. Therefore, the 
theoretical, methodological and practical basis of her conclusions will be put to the screws in 
order to understand her reasoning, which she claims to be universal and see if there are any 
flaws in the theory she coins. Consider it to be a ‘second opinion’ on her conclusions, which 
might be useful in case the fourteen signifiers she bases them on show any flaws.  
This thesis should however not merely be seen as a follow-up to De Graaf’s theory of 
performative power, but rather as the result of different influences from the field. Within this 
field, De Graaf’s work takes a unique stance by bringing those new developments together. 
Scholars such as Booth, Seniwati and Emmers for instance, stress the importance of more 
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inclusivity of terrorism in security studies in general. Furthermore, experts such as Bureš 
advocate for a better practical implementation of those new insights. De Graaf’s methods can 
be seen as innovative in the field. The practical implementation of counterterrorism often lacks, 
but is being concretised by De Graaf, as will be described in the literature review of this paper. 
Moreover, she broadens the scope of what is being considered terrorism (and therefore the tools 
that can be used in counterterrorism), exactly as Booth, Seniwati and Emmers argue. 
Theoretically, this thesis will also and partially be based on the so-called securitisation theory, 
as developed by the Copenhagen School. This theory is seen as one of the most important 
contributions to security studies over de past decades. The theory claims that security is 
intersubjective and socially constructive. This will be of huge importance to the research, since 
the fourteen signifiers as mentioned by De Graaf are largely based on the reaction of society to 
insecurity. De Graaf’s theory should, as will later be argued, be seen as a step beyond 
securitisation theory, considering the fact that it concretises acts being taken after topics are 
securitised. Therefore, the second and most important theory that will be investigated in this 
paper will be the theory of performative power, which will look into performative power and 
the fourteen signifiers. These will discussed in more detail in the second chapter of this paper. 
As mentioned before, the signifiers play a big role in measuring the performative power of 
governments. De Graaf had many sources at her disposal, but she decided to focus on the 
publications and archives of security services, minutes of the policy-making authorities and 
interviews with (former) civil servants of those organisations. Although some of these sources 
are hard to reach and/or classified for the topic of this research, there are many more official 
(press) publications by the authorities, which are more accessible than in the past. Therefore 
this paper’s sources can be limited to those official publications or interviews with those who 
are professionally involved (from the side of the authorities) with the topic (De Graaf, 2011: 5).  
To guide the development of the research, this paper will be structured as follows. After this 
introduction, firstly the literature review framework will follow. It concerns the current 
discourse in literature around terrorism studies, the literature review so to say. The reader will 
acquire a solid knowledge of where the Western and European societies are when it comes to 
terrorism, as well as a brief history of terrorism, coming from the 1800’s during the ‘birth of 
terrorism’, but there will be some extra attention for the high days of terrorism in Europe during 
the 1960’s and 1970’s. Concepts such as Rapoport’s four waves of terrorism and security theory 
will be reviewed to position De Graaf’s theory. 
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The next part of this research will focus on the theoretical framework. This chapter will dig into 
the theory of De Graaf and the fourteen signifiers as well as its operationalisation. The definition 
of performative power according to De Graaf will be introduced to make the reader familiar 
with the core theory of this research. To do so, other peripherical concepts such as performative 
power and an explanation of De Graaf’s perception of the way policymakers react to terrorism 
in society will be highlighted. The performativity of the state when it comes to counterterrorism 
as well as the current discourse around it will be discussed here. 
In the two following chapters, case studies will be conducted to test De Graaf’s theory of 
performative power and the fourteen signifiers and to see whether they are still useful these 
days. As mentioned before, the terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13th 2015 and in Nice on 
July 14th 2016 will be used as examples here. After providing the reader with brief summaries 
of the events and some facts and figures, the boxes of the fourteen signifiers will be ticked and 
the performativity in both cases will be schematised. To conclude these chapters, analyses of 
counterterrorism measures will be conducted in a following chapter. 
Last, but not least, all conclusions drawn from the chapters (but especially the two case studies) 
will be used to test whether the scheme and the fourteen signifiers as coined by De Graaf are 
still relevant to terrorism these days. This will happen in the conclusion. If necessary, 
suggestions for improvement and my point of view will be given. Recommendations for 







1 Literature review 
 
Terrorism and the threats it creates to societies are dominating the news and politics these days. 
Scholars, as well as policymakers and citizens have gotten more and more involved in the 
discourse around the causes, the impact and counterterrorist measures. Although terrorism as 
we know it was born long before the 20th century, the first thorough research conducted on the 
topic goes back to the 1970’s and 1980’s when Europe was struggling with the aftermath of 
terrorism committed by for example the Rote Armee Fraktion (West Germany), the 
Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (France) and the Brigate Rosse (Italy) (Crenshaw, 2014: 556-
559). However, the true catalyst for intensify research within academic circles were the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 in the United States (Sageman, 2014: 565-567) Since then, many researchers in 
different fields of expertise (social sciences, humanities, etc.) have been gathering data by 
monitoring  analysing terrorist acts all around the world (Freilich et al., 2009: 460). This chapter 
will provide the reader with a brief overview of the history of, and research done on terrorism 
in Europe and the world, and position De Graaf’s theories in the debate that evolved around it.  
1.1 Definitions of terrorism 
When talking about terrorism and counterterrorism, it should be highlighted that there is not 
and official definition of terrorism (and consequently counterterrorism); it concerns a 
phenomenon that is being debated about among scholars for a long time. When it comes to the 
data scholars are basing their research on, it generally evolves around three main ingredients, 
agreed on by on academia from all different disciplines. In general one should consider the role 
of three different stakeholders when it comes to terrorist acts, namely the perpetrators (or 
terrorists), the victims, and the audience (or public). (Sandler, 2015: 3). It does however not 
come as a surprise that all of these definitions come with some ambiguity. The maybe most 
controversial definition is the one of the victims. According to various scholars, combatants 
should not be counted as victims when it comes to freedom fighter in a country that is being 
occupied, such as happened during the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq. On the other hand, 
combatants serving as peacekeeping troops who are killed in action (such as in the US Marines 
barracks bombing in Lebanon in 1983) are being considered victims of terrorism, although the 
responsible terrorist movement (Hezbollah) might think so differently. When it comes to 
terrorist attacks in failed states such as Somalia (Al-Shabaab) the confusion might be even 
bigger, since the political motives for such actions might not always be clear enough to identify 
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friend or foe. Another definition that is easier to get grip on is the audience. University of 
Oxford’s political scientist Todd Sandler refers to the audience as 
‘The collective that terrorists seek to intimidate through their want on brutality. With 
sufficient and sustained intimidation, the audience will apply pressures on the besieged 
government to concede to the terrorist group’s political demand or alternatively to take 
decisive action to annihilate the group (Sandler, 2015: 3).’ 
In general, one refers to the general public (and public opinion in general here). As Sandler 
points out, it is mainly the first two definitions that cause ambiguity, as described above.  
1.2 The state of contemporary terrorism 
In 2002, UCLA’s professor of political science David C. Rapoport published his paper ‘The 
Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11’. In his paper, Rapoport brings to attention the 
fact that terrorism should not be seen as a new phenomenon, when it suddenly became a hot 
topic again after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. While describing the history of 135 years of terrorism, 
it becomes clear how deeply implanted it is in our modern culture. To this end, Rapoport 
introduces the so-called ‘Four Waves of Terrorism’, each triggered by international political 
changes or revolutions. (Rapoport, 2002: 11). 
 
The reasons for describing the history of terrorism making use of Rapoport’s ‘Four Waves of 
Terrorism’ are multiple, as De Graaf argues. The case studies De Graaf conducted all took place 
within the third or ‘New Left Wave’ during the 1960’s, 1970’s and 1980’s. Her reasons for 
doing so were as follows: 
 
‘As far as the period of terrorist violence and counterterrorist is concerned, the 1970’s 
was chosen, because the period of 30-40  years provides the opportunity for using a 
range of government documents on counterterrorist activities and facilitates more angles 
for research and analysist than current cases would. The terrorist (and counterterrorist) 
activities considered here constitute a finished episode in history. The terrorism of that 
age, described by Rapoport as the ‘third wave’ of revolutionary terrorism, has come to 
an end and can be made the subject of scrutiny without new incidents or measures 
disturbing objective analysis. At the same time, the 1970’s are still relevant to current 
discussions of counterterrorist strategies, since many of the institutions, instruments and 
provisions in combating terrorism were put in place in that decade. Political decisions-
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making processes were dictated by the same mechanisms of agenda setting and 
mobilising political and public support (De Graaf, 2010: 15).’  
 
The framework given by Rapoport will therefore give the reader more guidance when it comes 
to the positioning of the current terrorist movements, when comparing it to the work of for 
example De Graaf. Also, considering the fact that we have seen a fair share of the current wave, 
One can assume safely assume that the risk of can be made the subject of scrutiny, even though 
one should realise a few new incidents or measures disturbing objective analysis might still take 
place. This risk is however small, considering the fact that many incidents already happened, 
and many measures were already taken in the past decades. Therefore, what follows is a brief 
description of the waves as coined by Rapoport in 2002. 
 
The ‘Anarchist Wave’ appeared in Russia in the 1880’s and lasted for about 40 years. One of 
the reasons he mentions for the quick world-wide spread of this wave was the invention of the 
telegraph, daily mass newspapers, and the construction of railroads during this period of time, 
shrinking time and space. This did not only instigated violent terrorism in Russia, but also 
helped movements such as the Sons of Liberty and the Ku Klux Klan develop rapidly in the 
United states. Rapoport concluded that every new wave of terrorism lasted about 40 to 45 years 
and he was right. In the 1920’s, the world was flooded by new terrorist movements, which he 
summarises as the ‘Anti-Colonial Wave’. Terrorist groups arising in this time include what is 
being known as ‘the oldest terrorist movement’, namely the IRA. It concerned movements 
fighting for independence from the empires of the defeated states that were being broken up  by 
applying the principle of self-determination. Often so-called mandate states were created by the 
victors of WW I and WW II, which caused a discrepancy with their own national policies. They 
could not articulate the principle without also raising questions about the legitimacy of their 
own empires, as Rapoport stresses. A series of new states (e.g. Ireland, Israel, Cyprus, Yemen 
and Algeria) emerged (partly) as the result of such terrorism. The third wave, also known as the 
‘New Left Wave’ emerged during the Vietnam War. The Vietcong resistance against the might 
United States raised hoped that the western capitalist establishment would be vulnerable to this 
type of guerrilla warfare too. This kind of terrorist movements therefore mainly affected left-
wing youngster in the ‘developed world’. Groups such of the PLO, ETA, RAF and the Brigate 
Rosse were among the most successful of them.  International terrorism was really given a new 
spirit during this wave, considering the revolutionary ethos that created bonds between the 
separate groups. Some groups, such as the PLO conducted even more attacks abroad (Israel, 
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West Germany, France, etc.) than in their own home country. It was during the last decade of 
the third wave that the fourth wave, the so-called ‘Religious Wave’ began. Although religion 
played an important role in all of the previous waves, religious identity always overlapped with 
ethnicity in order to secure and create secular sovereign states. During the religious wave 
however, the goal was totally different. Whereas the previous wave hoped to establish new 
individual states, the new wave aimed for ‘[…] supplying justifications and organising 
principles for a New World to be established’. (Rapoport, 2002: 10-11). 
Another reason why describing the latter two waves of terrorism is of primordial importance to 
this research is as follows. As indicated above, 30 to 40 years after the end of the third wave, 
one can say it is safe to make an analysis of the latest wave. This offers two interesting 
opportunities. First of all, one can analyse the  tactics being used in the newer waves, as well 
as its long term developments. Secondly, and in my opinion most interesting, one can draw 
possible parallels with previous waves (which is the case according to De Graaf, considering 
the facts she claims her theory to be universal). On the other hand, although not mentioned 
explicitly, De Graaf points out there are huge differences between the two waves of terrorism 
which are under scrutiny here. She refers to them, within the context of the murder on right-
wing political activist and moviemaker Theo van Gogh in November 2004:  
‘As a historian, I was aware of a series of casualties and victims who died as a result of 
acts of political violence in the ‘red decade’ of the 1970s. Hardly anyone made 
references to that, however. Second, what struck me as odd was that during the first and 
second post-November 2004 years nobody seemed very interested in reflections on the 
effectiveness of all the new antiterrorist measures that were profoundly new to Dutch 
society […].’ (De Graaf, 2010: 3.). 
De Graaf here refers to the fact that there was an unprecedented upheaval in counterterrorist 
measures after just one political murder, compared with almost none in the 1970s, leaving the 
reader of her work with the question if her theory is really that universal if the approach during 
the ‘red decade’ has been very passive, whereas it has been more active while being 30 years 
into the new wave. Here one can wonder whether the Dutch state was really that ‘passive’ 
during the 1970s, and what the reason for doing so might have been. This however implies that 
there could even be a difference in applicability of the theory. It is for this reason that it is 
important to also apply her theory to, in this case, fourth wave terrorism (such as in Paris and 
Nice) in other circumstances (France) to see whether it is still valid, and for what reasons.  
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1.2.1 Context of contemporary and ‘fourth wave’ terrorism 
 
Although Europe was already used to terrorism since the 1960’s, the events  of 9/11 confronted 
the world to a new problem: transnational terrorism. Whereas terrorism was in general bound 
to individual countries before, new international networks could be identified now. The terrorist 
attacks that took place in Western countries, such as the ones in Boston, Las Vegas, Orlando, 
Paris, Brussels, London and Berlin perfectly make clear that terrorism does not only take place 
in the Middle East, Asia or Africa. Governments worldwide suddenly have to come up with 
solutions and combat terrorism together, as the so-called War on Terror (instigated by US 
President George W. Bush in 2001) perfectly illustrates. Scholars analysed five causes for the 
rapid global spread of terrorism, leading to a type of terrorism that is harder to cope with for 
the international community these days (Ugorji, 2017: 2-4) 
Firstly, the rise of Daesh in the Middle East as an umbrella network for terrorists worldwide 
counts for the emergence of terrorist attacks in Europe and the United States. Daesh is being 
held responsible for these attacks being committed by its affiliates in Western countries and for 
recruiting lone wolves over social media. Secondly, when it comes to terrorism in Africa, the 
para-military Boko Haram movement poses a threat to Western Africa. Although the terrorist 
movement mainly fights for an Islamic state in north-eastern Nigeria, the conflict has a spill-
over effect to neighbouring countries such as Niger, Cameroon, and Chad where the groups 
seems to get more foothold. Paradoxically, this seems to be the result of an effective military 
approach by the Nigerian army against the movement. Thirdly, again the success of the 
American military in finding and killing Osama Bin Laden, as well as the international 
community’s fruitful cooperation in bringing down the Khaddaffi regime, caused a power 
vacuum leading to the emergence of new terrorist activities in the Sahel region. The current 
mayhem in the region can be considered the result of a failed (or even non-existent) state, and 
the rebranding of Al-Qaeda after Bin Laden’s death. Fourthly, Al-Shabaab’s attacks in Somalia, 
Kenya and Ethiopia seem to be supported by a bigger international network of terrorists, 
wanting to create even more chaos in the Horn of Africa, again in a failed state. Fifthly, the 
successes of the War on Terror and the Coalition of the Willing in countries such as Afghanistan 
and Iraq have pushed the activities by terrorist actors towards neighbouring states. A steep 
increase of terrorist attacks can for instance be seen in Pakistan and Kurdistan. Over the past 
years the number of fatalities has been on a one-third rise in these regions. Lastly, the fact that 
lone wolves have gained ground in Western countries (instead of entire terrorist cells) 
demonstrates how serious the problem has become. The fragmented as well as the unpredictable 
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nature of these lone wolves is posing a bigger and bigger threat to Western societies (Ugorji: 2-
4). 
Scholars around the world have concluded that there are common drivers when it comes to the 
rise of terrorism. In developing countries, often the home base of terrorist networks such as Al-
Qaeda or Daesh, there are links between state sponsored violence and domestic or regional 
intractable conflicts or terrorism. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 for instance, gave birth to anti-
Western ideas in the entire Middle East. The death of Muammar Khaddaffi in Libya, the civil 
war in Syria and the enduring ethnic conflict in Iraq accelerated the spread of Daesh’s ideology 
from 2013 on. As concluded earlier, it has been the support from these regions that give a spark 
to terrorist actions in Western societies. In Western societies, those who commit attacks often 
seem to come from deprived backgrounds. It concerns youngsters susceptible to extreme 
Islamic ideology due to unemployment, social and / or cultural exclusion, access to weapons 
and of course social media, that commit these terrorist attacks (McCauley, Moskalenko, 2008: 
422).  
Transnational terrorism is therefore, instead of domestic terrorism, the biggest problem the 
world is currently facing. When looking at the biggest terrorist attacks of the past years for 
example, we can see a majority of the attacks is being committed by lone wolves inspired by 
Daesh, or terrorist cells supported by international networks such as Al-Qaeda or Daesh 
(McCauley, Moskalenko, 2014: 70). In the case studies that will be conducted in this paper, 
examples of both backgrounds will be used.  
1.3 The state of contemporary counterterrorism 
Considering the new transnational element, scholars consider international coordinated efforts 
from every effected country to be the only solution against terrorism. The United Nations 
General Assembly, in close cooperation with the United Nations Security Council have put 
effort in this by developing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UN General Assembly, 
8th of September 2006). The newly established UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task 
Force (CTITF) helps member states by taking four different types of counter-terrorism 
measures: 
‘Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; measures to 
prevent and combat terrorism; measures to build States’ capacity to prevent and combat 
terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard; and 
measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental 
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basis of the fight against terrorism’ (UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2006: Part 
I). 
When looking at the practical measures being applied by the CTITF, this translates to projects 
ranging from charity projects in order to avoid radicalisation, to trajectories to clean up nuclear, 
chemical or biological waste to prevent terrorist from acquiring weapons from it. Also, 
conferences are being held to raise awareness, and schools are being set up to train digital 
specialists to tackle future cyber threats (UN Office of Counter-terrorism).  
But not only the UN has made work of combatting terrorism in the world. Also in a European 
context, the European Council has implemented new measures, after several terrorist attacks 
within the European Union (e.g. London, Madrid, etc.). Although counterterrorist policies by 
the EU’s institutions and its predecessors can be traced back to the 1960’s, most measures that 
were taken were implemented shortly after the 9/11 and March 2004 attacks. It concerned a 
tighter cooperation in the field of justice and intelligence, especially when it comes to the 
exchange of information. Furthermore, additional responsibility and powers were transferred to 
Interpol and Europol in order to combat terrorism. According to Oldřich Bureš (Prague 
Metropolitan University), the EU’s counterterrorism policy risks to remain ‘more of a paper 
tiger than it is an effective counterterrorism device’. According to him, this is mainly due to the 
fact that a coherent approach by the responsible branch within the European Council; Justice 
and Home Affairs (JHA), is lacking. Borders simply still remain within the EU (Bureš, 2006: 
57-70).  
On a more national level, counterterrorism measures are taken very differently per country. 
This also has to do with the different approaches to the understand of the concept of 
counterterrorism by various countries and institutions both nationally and international, 
especially in relation to securitisation theory. Moreover, as Junker highlights, the diverse 
grouping of professionals and scholars are often not found together in the struggle against 
terrorist (ergo, counterterrorism), and their paths do not normally cross, leading to clashes in 
the preferred approach. (Bunker, 2015: 1). Policymakers, or operators as Bunker calls them, 
focus more on training, oversight, action, physical outcome and time critical schedules. The 
scholars (or theorists), rather look at the role of the individual, the immaterial outcome, idealism 
versus realism, and do not consider time to be a relevant factor. Both parties simply have 
different interests when it comes to battling terrorism and adding to counterterrorism practice.  
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As De Graaf also points out, the expectations of counterterrorism are therefore different. Both 
for policymakers, and for scholars. Furthermore, this also differs in various parts of the world. 
The idea about how to combat terrorism in Russia, can for example be different from the one 
in Europe. There is a lot of discrepancy about what approach is the most effective, since for 
instance arresting everybody within or close to a terrorist cell might cause the radicalisation of 
plenty of other terrorists. Policy makers can however also shift their scope towards prevention, 
but this might only have effects on the long term (De Graaf, 2010: 6).  
1.3.1 The debate around counterterrorism in the academic context 
 
It is especially on the academic level that there is still a lot of discussion on counterterrorism 
and its definition, leaving policymakers alone when it comes to the struggle against terrorism. 
As Buzan, Waever and De Wilde originally argued when they developed the idea of 
securitisation theory: ‘Security can be broadened to include other threats beyond the traditional 
the traditional military and political domain. Security depends on the character of the referent 
object in question.’ (Buzan et al., 1998). This obviously includes terrorism, and subsequently 
counterterrorism, as Smith (2005) and Booth stress: 
‘The critical approach [of securitisation theory] seeks to deepen conceptions of security, 
rather than merely broaden them’. ‘The realism of orthodox security studies is part of 
the problem in world politics rather than being the problem solver’ (Booth, 2005: 3). 
‘Nonconventional weapons and terrorism are certainly security threats’, Booth argues. 
It (the practice of counterterrorism) should be seen, according to Andreas and Price 
argue, as the growing fusion between law enforcement and a national security mission 
(Andreas and Price, 2011: 31). 
Just like the author of this paper and Cavelty, Seniwati emphasises the role of counterterrorism 
as a step ‘beyond securitisation theory’. A perfect link can be established between securitisation 
theory and counterterrorism strategies, according to Seniwati and his work on the issue of 
terrorism in Indonesia. Instead of the traditional three-step approach 2  for successful 
counterterrorism, he uses the approach as coined by Emmers and Caballero-Anthony in which 
the implementation of non-discursive action is implemented too (Seniwati, 2014: 236). It is 
very clear that terrorism these days is part of the range of different threats that should be 
included when it comes to securitisation theory. The main point of this debate in academics 
                                                            
2 Ranging from non-politicized, to politicized an finally securitised (Buzan et al.) 
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however is, where and if counterterrorism can be included in the three-step system as originally 
coined by Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, or if it is time to ‘update’ the model as proposed by 
the Copenhagen School back in the 1980’s.   
Another important debate that is current going on when it comes to counterterrorism and its 
role in states that are ‘under attack’, is to what extent acts of counterterrorism (e.g. state of 
emergency, detention without trial, possible torture, etc.) can be legitimised by the authorities 
in such a state, in short; what the limits of counterterrorism are. A series of measures that 
counterterrorism scholar Andrew Neal defines as ‘exceptionalism’ (Neal, 2010: 1). 
Does exceptionalism save lives, or is it destroying the freedoms and the law that the people 
have acquired over time, and that the state has is supposed to protect? As the legal expert Carl 
Schmitt once argued: ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ while stressing that there 
is always the possibility of an existentially threatening exceptional event of situation that falls 
beyond the limits of law, liberty, rights and constitutional government. Not more than logical, 
according to Schmitt. Just like in the debate around the inclusivity of counterterrorism, scholars 
seem to not agree with each other on this in these times of increasing awareness when it comes 
to for example privacy. Nevertheless, Schmitt seems to be on the ‘winning’ side these days, 
considering the fact that our current state system has its political and philosophical limits. As 
will be made clear in the case studies that will follow (Neal, 2010: 2). 
When looking at the other side, Neal argues that the classic discourse on liberty and security 
are flawed. According to the origins of this relationship (Hobbes and Kant), liberty is only 
possible under heavily restrictive political conditions. One can in that case not talk about liberty 
or security, but rather liberty under security. Terrorism and consequently counterterrorism do, 
because of their very nature, operate outside of the limits that liberty and security offer, as 
Hobbes and Kant did not foresee (Neal, 2010: 3). 
As the examples about counterterrorism above have shown, its definition, its role in relation to 
security studies, and where its moral and legal limits are, are under scrutiny. The case studies 
conducted in this paper, will clearly show that these debates remain important and relevant, in 





2 Theoretical framework 
 
This section will introduce the reader to two main theories that will be used in this paper: 
securitisation theory and performative power theory. As will be explained later on in this 
chapter, the latter theory will be analysed and evaluated in the case studies, and should be seen 
as the ‘step beyond securitisation theory’. Securitisation theory serves as an ‘inspiration’ for 
performative power theory, one could say. Performative power theory scan be considered the 
‘result’ of the securitisation of a certain topic. Therefore, securitisation theory will be discussed 
first, before introducing performative power theory and its key findings, as well as the analytical 
framework which will be used in order to properly analyse both theories.  
2.1 Securitisation theory 
One of the theories that will be central in investigating the idea of performative power in 
terrorism, and a theory that has already proven its importance in general when it comes to 
conflict in general, is securitisation theory as coined by the so-called Copenhagen School. This 
trend of thought emerged after the Cold War, when scholars suggested that the scope of security 
studies should be both widened and deepened, adding extra dimensions to security (besides the 
military). Securitisation theory, mainly associated with Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, argued 
that security issues are not a hundred percent objective. They are rather subjective, something 
socially constructed, Buzan and Waever argued. According to them, a security issue has to go 
through several stages before it becomes securitised (namely; non-politicised, politicised, 
securitised). In this process, actors use ‘speech acts’, designating a threat to a referent object, 
and declares it an existential threat, leading to the right to use extraordinary means or break 
formal rules for security reasons to tackle the threat (Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan and Waever, 
2003). 
The idea of the speech act is based on three different units in the process. Firstly, there are the 
referent objects: who or what is said to be existentially threatened and has a legitimate claim to 
survival (i.e. states or nations). Secondly, there are the securitising actors: people that are 
securitising an issue by stating that a referent object is threatened (this happens in general by 
political leaders, authorities, etc.). Thirdly, functional actors: people affecting and influencing 
decisions in the given field (this can be either military, politically or environmentally for 
instance). If all these actors respond correctly to each other, and if the audience the arguments 
given by them, one can speak about a securitised move. (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). 
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For the reasons given above, securitisation is and intersubjective process, which means that it 
does not concern an objective threat. It is hard to measure the result, so to say. It can rather be 
described as a subjective threat perception, which is accepted by a fair share of the public (De 
Graaf, 2010: 10-11). As De Graaf argues, securitisation theory contributes to performative 
power since her study: 
‘ […] takes this approach some steps forward by applying the idea of ‘securitisation’ to 
the political decision making process, the vying for support and the setting of the 
discourse of counterterrorism. Setting the political agenda, generating political and 
public support and framing the threat are parts of a social and cultural process of 
‘securitisation’ that draws on existing political traditions and fears but which, invoking 
national crises, can construct new ones as well (De Graaf, 2010: 10-11).’ 
Several scholars support De Graaf in her line of thought here. Terrorism experts such as 
Kruglanski, Crenshaw, Post and Victoroff argue for example that counterterrorism policies do 
not only include objective measures, but that their framing and presentation are also of 
primordial importance to make them work (Kruglanski et al., 2008: 58-65). According to them, 
counterterrorism is simply of form of communication, like securitisation theory seems to argue 
too (De Graaf, 2010: 10-11). The stance of Kruglanski, Crenshaw, Post and Victoroff are taking 
here, shows the added value of De Graaf’s concept of performative power. Whereas 
securitisation theory in general the steps that are being taken following the securitisation of an 
event or series of events (terrorist attacks in this instance), objective measures but especially 
framing and presentation of those acts are the most important (Kruglanski et al., 2008: 58-65). 
A gap De Graaf is filling. 
2.1.1 When is securitisation of counterterrorism successful? 
In order to answer the main question being asked in this paper, it is of utmost importance to 
decide when counterterrorism and performative power can be deemed ‘successful’. If a basic 
definition of success cannot be established, it would be hard to decide whether the a next step, 
a step ‘beyond securitisation’ (as will be discussed later in this chapter), is relevant to make and 
measure.  
The definition of ‘successful’ in this context is of course an ambiguous one. The founding 
fathers of securitisation theory, Buzan, Waever and De Wilde do however and luckily provide 
us with a solid definition (Buzan et al. 1998: 6) In their opinion, securitisation is successful 
when a speech act is conducted, a referent object is regarded as an existential threat, and an 
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audience that is responding to and accepting the securitisation. This leads to, most importantly 
for the research question of this paper, the conclusion that the result of successful securitisation 
is a shared recognition that extraordinary counter-measures are necessary and legitimate in 
order to counter a threat. This means that if the audience does not accept that the referent object 
is under an existential threat, the securitising move will fail (Karsten, 2016 : 29).  
2.2 Performative power 
The main framework being using in these paper will be the De Graaf’s ‘performative power’. 
The key question De Graaf is asking herself is: What do counterterrorism officials want? When 
it comes to terrorism it is those officials setting the agenda and having to respond to terrorist 
activities. They have to take the measures and basically ‘sell’ these to the public, also to raise 
enough support of both the public and subsequently the politicians. Two words are key here: 
performativity and process . As De Graaf states herself, it concerns ‘the way in which they (the 
policy-makers) perform, or in other words carry out the process of countering terrorism, can 
have more impact than the actual arrests being made (or not being made).’ The focus of her 
research is what she calls the performativity of counterterrorism, or its ‘performative power’. 
To be more exact: 
‘Performative power expresses the extent to which a national government, by means of 
its official counterterrorism policy and corresponding discourse (in statements, 
enactments, measures and ministerial remarks), is successful in ‘selling’ its 
representation of events, its set of solutions to the terrorist problem, as well as being 
able to set the tone for the overall discourse regarding terrorism and counterterrorism – 
hereby mobilising different audiences for its purposes (De Graaf 2011: 3).’ 
De Graaf acknowledges here that the state is obviously not the only player when it comes the 
field of counterterrorism (think of advisors, politicians and academics for instance) and 
measures taken to reduce the risks. Therefore, she highlights that this theory stresses the 
attempts made by governments to influence the public opinion when it comes to the legitimacy 
and accuracy of its counterterrorism policy. In the whole context of terrorism, De Graaf 
indicates that there exists a set of so-called ‘signifiers’ affecting counterterrorism. Here is 
concerns mechanisms that mainly influence public opinion, needed to make counterterrorist 
measures work. Here is does however involve mechanisms that can work both ways: they can 
either boost public support, or inflame hostile sentiments against the government(s) and even 
create support for terrorist groups. A good example of such damaging behaviour would be for 
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instance the ‘War on Terror’ after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, instigated by the United States and 
their allies, the ‘Coalition of the Willing’. The Muslim world perceived this act as a combination 
of both anti-Muslim and imperialist. Beatrice de Graaf and Bob de Graaff even consider this 
act as an a curse to Western society, instead of some sort of crusade against terrorism (De Graaf, 
De Graaff: 2010).  
The former British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, David Miliband, realised this, stating: 
‘The call for a ‘war on terror’ was a call to arms, an attempt to build solidarity for a fight 
against a single shared enemy. But the foundation for solidarity between peoples and 
nations should be based not on who we are against, but on the idea of who we are and 
the values we share. Terrorists succeed when they render countries fearful and vindictive; 
when they sow division and animosity; when they force countries to respond with 
violence and repression. The best response is to refuse to be cowed (De Graaf & De 
Graaff, 2010: 272).’ 
Miliband singlehandedly identified a ‘signifier’ that triggered performative power of 
counterterrorism in a negative way, De Graaf and de Graaff say. The United States and the 
United Kingdom mobilisation of the public turned against them both domestically and 
internationally after the promise of extreme measures. Public opinion therefore plays a key role 
when it comes to performative power in counterterrorism. As terrorism expert Brian Jenkins 
once stated in a 1975 RAND report: ‘(t)errorism is theatre’. The goal of terrorist is to induce 
fear to societies. Waldmann argues that the reaction of (and the impact on) society can luckily 
purposely be affected by the government in various ways. Less visible drama and strengthening 
the state’s power are of primordial importance to the authorities prevent the terrorists from 
reaching their goals (De Graaf & De Graaff, 2010: 272). 
Miliband managed to identify one signifier of performative power. Of course, many distinctions 
can be made when it concerns public opinion and how to influence it when it comes to 
counterterrorism. In total, De Graaf has identified fourteen signifiers, which will be introduced 
below, and which will later on be applied to the case studies. The thin line between failure and 
success in coping with terrorism makes it even more relevant to identify signifiers and it will 
be this question being central in this paper (De Graaf & De Graaff, 2010: 272).  
2.2.1 Signifiers 
The fourteen signifiers as discussed by De Graaf can be divided into three aspects: aspects 
pertaining to politicisation of counterterrorism, aspects pertaining to discursive framing on the 
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terrorist threat, and aspects pertaining to mobilisation efforts in the struggle against terrorism. 
The three aspects will be introduced accordingly. 
2.2.1.1 Aspects pertaining to politicisation of counterterrorism 
The first four signifiers dig into the politicisation of counterterrorism. The focus of these aspects 
will be on the processes of radicalisation and polarisation in society. It stresses for example 
people who have died or got wounded as a result of terrorist attacks. This is important since it 
influences for example politics or the perceived risks, and to what extent the public is willing 
to get involved in counter-terrorism measures. (De Graaf, 2010: 235).  
‘1. More attention for counter-terrorism is generated when political leaders personally 
and explicitly express themselves on the issue, rather than leaving this to lower level 
authorities. When counter-terrorism has a high priority, and is demonstrated as such by 
the highest possible political authority (e.g. in a presidential speech), the level of 
performative power is correspondingly higher. 
2. When counter-terrorism becomes the central issue in electoral campaigns or is 
employed to demonise the political opponent, the issue is politicised and the 
performativity increases. 
3. When the perceived personal risk is high and counter-terrorism officials feel directly 
threatened themselves (for instance because colleagues have previously been the target 
of terrorist actions), the performative power increases as well, since the sense of urgency 
of the threat is higher. 
4. The resonance of terrorist violence and the extent to which the public is prepared to 
accept counter-terrorism measures is also amplified when the issue has national priority 
over other issues (such as financial crises, environmental hazards, etc.). On the contrary, 
if new crises from a completely different policy field emerge, attention from terrorism 
might drift away, and the performativity decreases.’ (De Graaf, 2011: 4). 
 
2.2.1.2 Aspects pertaining to discursive framing of the terrorist threat  
When it comes to the discursive framing of the terrorist threats, the focus will be on the role of 
the security and intelligence services regarding politicisation. What is their concrete policy 
towards terrorists or how is the threat being demarcated? Are the security forces making uses 
of certain existing views or fears, etc. (De Graaf, 2010: 239).  
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‘5. When the threat is expanded to include not only the specific terrorist offenders, but 
also sympathisers and the broader terrorist constituency, the threat demarcation becomes 
broader and more urgent, which also fuels the degree of performativity. 
6. When war rhetoric is used or the tone of the discourse grows more militant, the 
performative power increases. 
7. When counter-terrorism officials or politicians refer to historical experiences of (civil) 
war, chaos and violence, existing or slumbering fears are invoked and the persuasiveness 
of counter-terrorism policy and the severity of the threat are enhanced. 
8. The explicit refusal to ‘talk to’ terrorists – not wanting to enter into negotiations with 
them, for instance, or not offering them exit-strategies or reintegration programmes – 
also keeps the level of performative power high. 
9. When no shared tradition, culture or overlap of values exists between the terrorists 
and those countering their actions and counter-terrorism policies explicitly capitalise on 
this mental distance, the discourse will be increasingly irreconcilable and intransigent. 
In such a case, the performative power is high: society rallies against political violence, 
the (alleged) terrorist sympathisers feel antagonised.’ (De Graaf, 2011: 4) 
2.2.1.3. Aspects pertaining to mobilisation efforts in the struggle against terrorism 
Lastly, the specific set of measures taken when it comes to legislation and the spectrum of 
violence are being considered under aspects pertaining mobilisation efforts. Before one can act 
against terrorism, new laws should be introduced and ratified. Furthermore, if authorities decide 
to make use of a broader spectrum of arms or units this should be mentioned under this category 
of aspects (De Graaf, 2010: 241).  
‘10. Counter-terrorism officials can also explicitly and directly mobilise the population. 
By placing fugitive terrorists on a ‘Ten Most Wanted’ list and initiating raids or witch 
hunts, the population becomes directly involved in counter-terrorism. This increases the 
visibility of the measures and demonstrates the government’s decisiveness, but also 
increases the level of performance of counterterrorism policy. 
11. Deploying special units that are generally trained for a higher spectrum of violence 
than regular police units to investigate, prosecute or arrest terrorists adds more drama to 
the situation, which leads to an increase in the performative power. 
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12. The introduction of new anti-terrorism legislation also increases the performative 
power, since it establishes new legal categories, new offences and new types of 
perpetrators in the counter-terrorism discourse. 
13. The introduction of new legislation – such as a ‘gag law’, data mining provisions or 
a law on control orders – that is not specifically aimed at terrorism also gives counter-
terrorism policy a supplementary boost, since new laws affect the tone of the discussion, 
attract media attention and affect the terrorist’s constituencies. 
14. Major ‘terrorism trials’ – trials that involve national or regional prosecution officers 
(or Grand Juries) trying well-known individuals or entire groups – often serve to 
generate a dynamic and mobilising power (such as solidarity campaigns, hunger strikes, 
protest demonstrations, acts of revenge, etc.). Hence, the performativity of 
counterterrorism increases.’ (De Graaf, 2011: 5) 
2.3 Key findings about performative power 
 
While doing research on the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), the Brigate Rosse (BG), the Black 
Panther Movement (BPP), and the Moluccan movements in the Netherland, De Graaf applied 
her ideas of performative power and the fourteen signifiers on all of those cases. De Graaf drew 
some interesting conclusions about the struggle of governments against terrorism. Her work 
indicated for instance that there is a correlation in how counterterrorism measures were 
performed, and to what extent the authorities managed to ‘mobilise’ the public, and the success 
of terrorist activity on the other hand. The results of this relation are however not always 
obvious. (De Graaf, 2011: 3). 
Firstly, she concludes (as one might expect) that if the number of people dying or getting 
harmed as the result of  terrorist attack is high, the response when it comes to counterterrorism 
and performative power will be high. This seems to be very obvious, considering the fact that 
such attacks lead to havoc and mayhem, covered by the media, triggering social fear, and being 
securitised quickly. However, and now it is getting interesting, this causal relationship does not 
always hold true. De Graaf points out that the opposite might actually also be true. According 
to her, a lack of counterterrorism policy can influence violence positively. In short: a high level 
of performative power, introducing many laws, mobilising the public, etc., can increase the 
number of terrorist attacks leading to even more casualties. This was the case with the RAF, 
BG and BPM in the 1970’s for instance. However, when looking beyond this point of high 
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performative power, one can spot a decrease in terrorist violence too, as soon as the 
performative power is declining. This causality can be explained in different ways of course 
(such as a short delay in between measures being ratified and valorised for instance), but it is 
still surprising to see that a high level of performativity even increased radicalisation and 
terrorist violence. De Graaf argues that this is mostly the result of the terrorists realising their 
actions are considered ‘useless’, seeing their attacks are failing to influence the public in the 
way they want them to see it. Consequently, the terrorist movements fails to further expand 
their operations (De Graaf, 2011: 6-7).   
Secondly, and most surprisingly, De Graaf draws attention to the fact that a shortage of 
counterterrorism measures, manpower or instruments (or its weak implementation) does not 
necessarily mean a detrimental effect on performative power of a state. De Graaf gives the 
example of Moluccan violence in the Netherlands in the 1970’s and 1980’s, where the Dutch 
government only decided to focus on decreasing radicalisation tendencies to avoid public fear. 
This resulted in the number of Moluccan terrorists willing to commit violence was waning. It 
also diminished the existing fears and positively influencing the public debates and discourse 
on national security vis-à-vis insecurity. However, even in more polarised societies such as 
West Germany,  which was being torn apart by violence of the leftist terrorist RAF, a lower 
degree of performative power can positively contribute to diminishing terrorist violence. The 
German Minister of the Interior, Gerhart Baum, managed to do so in 1979, by joining former 
RAF member Horst Mahler in his appeal for more deliberation and less polarisation. Something 
that would have been unimaginable in the preceding decades (De Graaf, 2011: 7).  
Although a monopoly on violence and connection to the media and the public remain important, 
these conclusions show that even non-conventional ways might defuse tensions in society and 
can reduce terrorist activity. There might be alternatives for policy-makers and politicians than 
maintaining policies or enacting new ones that show state power and that aim to mobilise the 
public en masse (De Graaf, 2011: 7). Considering the before-mentioned developments in 
society (e.g. social media, globalisation, etc.), this paper will try to analyse whether these 







2.4 Analytical framework 
This section will provide the reader with information on the more practical side of this research. 
The methods (in this instance the case studies), the operationalisation (the research questions 
that will be taken into account) and the data will be discussed to prove the validity of the way 
in which research is being conducted in this paper.  
2.4.1 Methods 
As mentioned above, the Copenhagen School and securitisation theory can play an important 
role in counterterrorism these days, considering the fact that it can be seen as the step before 
performative power enters effect. In general, one analyses relevant texts to study securitisation, 
which will be done in the form of case studies and qualitative content analysis in this paper. 
Before doing so, this section will briefly dig into the concept of case study research. 
Nowadays, the case study method is being used more and more for qualitative research. 
According to Yin, ‘the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real-life events, such as organisation and managerial processes.’ 
A common concern about the usefulness of case studies is therefore the fact that they do not 
provide a solid basis for scientific generalisation. Yin’s response to this is that: 
‘case studies […] are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or 
universes. In this sense, the case study […] does not represent a ‘sample’, and in doing 
a case study, your goal will be to generalise theories (analytical generalisation) and not 
to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalisation) (Yin, 2003: 10)’.   
He also points out some other important characteristics of case study research, which in his 
view render it even more useful. According to Yin,: 
‘A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident’, something we have already concluded earlier in this 
paper, considering the ambiguity of for example the definition of ‘terrorism’ and many 
others. Furthermore, according to Yin, ‘The case study inquiry copes with the 
technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest 
than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data 
needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from the 




As argued before, the most used way of studying securitisation is by means of qualitative 
content analysis of relevant texts, also since as Balzacq argues ‘content analysis emphasizes the 
measurability of variables or counting and coding’ (Balzacq, 2011: 51). This paper will 
however be, to some extent, an exception to this idea. Whereas texts and articles still play an 
important role when it comes to securitisation, this research will mainly seek to approach the 
theory coined by De Graaf from a different angle. It is therefore not necessarily a 
methodological choice that has been made here, but rather a choice of what topic exactly has to 
be studied. The angle has already been selected, and the author will try to test the falsifiability 
of De Graaf’s theory regarding performative power, hopefully contributing to either a better 
understanding or suggesting improvements. 
As described in earlier section of this paper, this research will follow all of the elements 
described above, for the purpose of theoretical orientation and interest in individual cases, the 
terrorist attacks in both Paris and Nice in this case. When it comes to the practical 
implementation of these case studies, a rather odd but very useful approach will be used. Each 
case study will start with a brief overview of the events that happened on the specific night. 
Afterwards, this paper will not follow a chronological order, but divide the events and their 
consequences among the three categories in which the signifiers can be found, establishing a 
clear overview of the signifiers present or absent. 
2.4.2 Operationalisation 
Case study research is a very effective method for the purposes of this paper, as it allows to 
study both the core of the theory (securitisation theory in combination with ‘checking the boxes’ 
by means of the fourteen signifiers) as well as analyse the practical consequences of certain 
policy choices. Whereas the type of methodology was described in the section above, this part 
of the paper will highlight how case study research will exactly be used throughout this work.  
Obviously, it will be the research question that will be guiding the research conducted in the 
case studies to be analysed. For this reason, it is of importance to reiterate the research question 
posed at the beginning of this paper: To what extent is the theory of performative power as 
coined by Beatrice de Graaf still applicable to contemporary cases of terrorism in Europe? 
Moreover, it is of equal importance to have a good overview of the theories that have been 
chosen for answering this question. As the research question already indicates, the main theory 
to be used is the one on performative power, as coined by De Graaf in 2010. This work will 
however also keep an eye on securitisation theory since, as De Graaf indicates herself too, it is 
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in close relation with her own theory. Both De Graaf and Waever, work with a list of variables 
and the basis of variables when it comes to performative power seem to be close to each other.  
The only difference, in the author’s opinion, is however the ‘stage’ in which these variables 
are analysed. Whereas securitisation theory asks questions such as: Who securitises? Which 
issues? For whom or what? Under which conditions? With what results? (Buzan et al., 1998: 
32). De Graaf however, takes it to the next level by already asking follow-up questions: How 
to securitise? Which measures are being used? What is the effect? How is society dealing with 
the new the conditions or possible results? De Graaf’s theory is basically about the question 
how to substantiate the concept of the ‘state of exception (as coined by Giorgio Agamben) as 
result of the securitisation process, in which he describes why and how a sovereign state has 
the ability to use the rule of law in the name of the public good, and on what legal basis this 
happens, in relation to securitisation theory (Hanrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014: 1). 
It is interesting to see that such a ‘next stage’ has already been earlier described in different 
works. Dunn Cavelty, who’s works and research were considered of great importance to make 
cyber-threats one of the main threats in modern times in the US history, already noticed this 
‘two-phased approach’. Although cyber-threats might look like quite a different topic, and not 
relevant for the research being conducted here, I would like to highlight the importance of the 
type of approach Cavelty is using here. Whereas he applies this approach mainly to threat 
politics, he describes how any threat can be taken beyond securitisation, and hence, according 
to the author of this paper, beyond securitisation theory, making it relevant to this paper too.  
‘While the first phase focuses on the initial framing and securitisation move, until the 
issue has made its way successfully onto the agenda and elicits its first policy response, 
the second phase starts when the issue at hand is on the agenda and subsequently begins 
to undergo change (Dunn Cavelty, 2008: 24).’ 
Considering the subject of this paper – terrorism in the 2010’s – and the case studies selected, 
there will be less attention for the first stages of securitisation theory. As the case studies will 
perfectly illustrate, terrorism in France in 2015 and 2016 was already in a securitised stage 
(mainly due to the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris on January 7th 2015). As the matter of fact, 
terrorism is very often a securitised topic, considering the violent disruptive effect it has on 
society. It is however especially the second phase that is of interest to this paper, considering 
the fact that it wants to find out what the nature of the security measures drafted by the 
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securitising actor (the French government in this case) is. In this way, securitisation theory, 
performative power, and the case studies will be theoretically covered.  
Since the goal of this paper is to find out whether De Graaf’s theory is still applicable for cases 
of terrorism in Europe in the 2010’s, two case studies have been picked. The focus will be on 
following questions, mainly drawn from the fourteen signifiers: 
 Has there been any change in the aspects pertaining to politicisation of counterterrorism? 
 Has there been any change in the aspects pertaining to discursive framing of the terrorist 
threat? 
 Has there been any change in the aspects pertaining to mobilisation efforts in the 
struggle against terrorism? 
 How did the French government act after the selected cases of terrorism, when it comes 
to performative power, and which effect did this have? 
 How can our understanding of contemporary terrorism help to further develop or 
improve the theory of performative power? 
By answering these specific questions, together with our prior knowledge of De Graaf’s theory 
and case studies as described in her work, it will be possible to get a good understanding of how 
and to what extent the theory of performative power is still applicable to contemporary cases 
of terrorism in Europe. This will not only lead to a ‘yes or no answer’ when it comes to fighting 
terrorism. It will also provide the reader of this paper with a very good understanding of how 
counterterrorism developed over time, considering the fact that case of counterterrorism from 
the 1960’s, 1970’s and 1980’ will be compared with examples from 2015 and 2016. Moreover, 
it will make clear what type of counterterrorism measures do work, and which one do not. To 
this end, all primary and secondary sources used in this paper will be addressed while keeping 
the questions mentioned above in mind.  
2.4.3. Data 
Although De Graaf had many resources at her disposal, she decided to focus her research on 
publications and on the archives of security services, minutes of the policy-making authorities 
and interview with (former) civil servants of those bodies. Despite the fact that this paper aims 
to ‘test’ De Graaf’s theory and apply it to two contemporary cases, the decision was made to 
only consult resources that are openly available. The explanation for doing so it three-fold. 
Many resources are however still classified, considering the secret nature of the operations that 
might still be going on. It might therefore harder to consult those types of information, although 
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authorities seem to be more transparent than decades ago. This was much more different in the 
case of De Graaf’s work ‘Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance: A comparative study’, 
published in 2010, where she analysed files that used to be classified for many years, but that 
were disclosed in the decades after. Considering the fact that the case studies to be described 
concerns events that took place in 2015 and 2016, it will be harder but not impossible to find 
such resources. Moreover, we have already concluded that, since performative power is closely 
related to securitisation theory, it is especially the information that is open to the public, and 
the information that is publicised, being influential for the public opinion and support. 
Classified information does not reach the ordinary people and is therefore of no interest to our 
research. Lastly, it is simple for the sake of length and the feasibility of conducting this research 
that the types of sources have to be limited. For this last reason, it has been decided by the 
author not to put too much emphasis on the role of social media when it comes to primary 
sources. This will however be discussed via secondary sources, to not lose ourselves in 
analysing a too extensive data set research. 




(documents outlining the French 
State’s natural and fundamental 
security tasks. Documents 
resulting from and reacting on 
the terrorist attacks that will be 
analysed, as well as declarations 
or introductions of new policies, 
laws, etc. that might have 
influence performative power) 
 
- French Presidential Press Office (www.Elysee.fr)  
- French Governmental Press Office (www.gouvernement.fr) 





Public Statements or 
Press Releases 
(Here it concerns the public 
declarations by important 
officials when it comes to 
counterterrorism policy) 
 
- French Presidential Press Office (www.Elysee.fr)  
- French Governmental Press Office (www.gouvernement.fr) 
- French Foreign Ministry (www.diplomatie.gouvernement.fr) 
- French Official Press Office (www.vie-publique.fr) 
 
  
Other relevant documents  
- Daily Newspaper The Local (www.thelocal.fr) 
- Daily Newspaper Le Figaro (www.figaro.fr) 
 
 
Although more types of data would certainly broad the scope of this paper, the author is 
convinced that the set of resources described above will be capable of answering the key 
questions posed. Gaps in primary sources, on which this document will mainly rely, will be 
complemented with carefully selected and recent literature on the topic. It will concern books, 
academic articles within the field of security and counterterrorism studies, drawn from 
renowned journals and think tanks. By adding this secondary literature, the events that 




3 The Paris attacks 
This chapter will provide the reader with a detailed case study of the terrorist attacks that took 
place on the 13th of November 2015, as part of a comparison with another terrorist attacks taking 
place on the 14th of July, the year after. The aim is to inform the reader of this paper with the 
basic information about the attacks, and to determine which security and counterterrorist 
measures were taken during the six months after the events. At the end of the chapter, a 
schematisation of the previously discussed fourteen signifiers as coined by De Graaf to measure 
the degree of performative power. 
3.1 Line of events 
On the night of Friday the 13th of November 2015, France was hit by several terrorist attacks in 
its capital Paris. Gunmen and suicide bombers hit a concert hall, a major stadium, restaurants 
and bar, almost simultaneously, leaving 130 people dead and hundreds wounded. It all started 
around 21:20 at the ‘Stade de France’, where the French and German national teams were 
playing a soccer game in attendance of French President François Hollande and his German 
counterpart Angela Merkel. Three suicide bombers detonated their suicide belts within several 
minutes, killing themselves and one by-passer. Soon after, several carnages would take place 
in the city centre. With one ‘suicide squad’ having killed themselves, two other squads were 
still heading for their targets. From 21:25 until 21:40, the first band managed to drive by several 
terraces in the Marais district of Paris and kill dozens of people enjoying the start of the weekend, 
being shot by police officers. The last squad managed to get into the, by now, infamous Bataclan 
theatre and take the a concert-going crowd hostage before eventually killing many of them. Not 
a single active shooter survived that night. Police officials did however manage to arrest the 
brains behind the attacks that night: Salah Abdeslam and Mohamed Abrini. All assailants were 
radicalised Muslims, having strong ties with the Islamic State (BBC, 9th of December 2015).  
3.2 Analysis of counterterrorist measures 
The next section will discuss the most important measures taken by the French counterterrorism 
officials during the period following the terrorist attacks of the 13th of November 2015. For the 
sake of clarity, the measures will not be written down chronologically, but divided into the three 
groups of signifiers, as discussed earlier in this paper: Measures pertaining to politicisation of 
counterterrorism, measures pertaining to discursive framing of the terrorist threat, and measures 
pertaining to mobilisation efforts in the struggle against terrorism. In this way, it will be much 
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easier to identify and group the counterterrorism measures taken, and to put them in under a 
specific signifier in the scheme.  
3.2.1 Counterterrorist measures politicising the threat 
Another interesting measure taken after the Paris attacks, was the result of French 
counterterrorism officials feeling themselves directly threatened, with a perception of high 
personal risk. Police volunteers were quickly allowed to carry their guns while being off-duty 
after the national police organisation asked for it. Firstly, it would offer the police officers to 
protect themselves in case terrorists would target them. Secondly, the statement says, policemen 
must have to fight back, prevent or stop terrorist attacks from happening, if they see such things 
during their off-time. Former French president François Hollande even encouraged the 
municipal authorities (who are in charge of the police) to arm the police even while being off-
duty (Le Figaro, 14th of June 2016).  
Also interesting to see, was the level of politicisation of the threat in an international context. 
There was a lot of criticism on the French government after the Paris attacks, since bad 
cooperation between the Belgian and French intelligence service apparently prevented them 
from avoid the attacks. Although the terrorists were already ‘in the picture’, intelligence was 
not shared between them. The issue was quickly politicised and both countries found a way to 
share information more quickly, considering the fact that the terrorists’ roots could be found in 
Belgium too. Former French Prime Minister expressed himself personally here, rather than 
leaving it to lower authorities to solve the problems (French Governmental Press Office, 1st of 
February 2016). 
Important to mention here is the role that politicians play when it comes to politicising the threat 
of terrorism. Although all French political parties cried wolf over the events, and wanted more 
investments in counterterrorism measures, the signifier related to making counterterrorism a 
central issue in electoral campaigns or employing it to demonise the political opponent cannot 
be valorised here. The next elections of any importance when it comes counterterrorism policy, 
would take place in May 2017, meaning that it would not be within the six-month period this 
paper is investigating. Therefore, this signifier is not being touched upon when it comes to the 
Paris attacks.  
3.2.2 Counterterrorist measures framing the threat 
One of the strongest and most immediate acts conducted by the French government, in 
combating fear in the public opinion, was a speech by former president François Hollande on 
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the day after the attacks. Besides mentioning the number of casualties and announcing the state 
of emergency and the closure of the borders, Hollande used a very violent type of rhetoric: 
‘This is a terrible ordeal which once again assails us. We know where it comes from, 
who these criminals are, who these terrorists are. […] Face with terror, France must be 
strong, it must be great and the state authorities must be firm. We will be. […] What the 
terrorists want is to scare us and fill us with dread. There is indeed reason to be afraid. 
There is dread, but in the face of this dread, there is a nation that knows how to defend 
itself, that knows how to mobilise its forces and, once again, will defeat the terrorists 
(French Foreign Ministry, 16th of November 2015)’. 
This type of speech act can clearly be linked to several signifiers under counterterrorist 
measures framing the threat. Firstly, war rhetoric was used and the tone of the debate became 
more militant than it was before. Secondly, Hollande (as a counterterrorism official), was 
referring to historical experiences existing and slumbering fears, existing after the terrorist 
attacks at Charlie Hebdo earlier that year. Thirdly, by using language such as ‘defeat the 
terrorists’, the former president clearly indicates the explicit refusal to talk or negotiate with the 
terrorists. By giving just one speech, he managed to touch upon three signifiers in the field of 
framing the terrorist threat.  
Another measure taken by French government officials was the increased security in public 
transport. It did however not specifically concerns special police of army units being introduced, 
or any new legislation. Although in general this measure was widely dismissed as a ‘security 
theatre’, due to its limited scope, the public transport was considered as a high priority target 
for terrorists. The authorities were therefore specifically trying to mobilise the public and 
involve them in counterterrorist measures (The Local, 19th of July 2016).  
In the aftermath the terrorist attacks, the French government noticed that secularism had to be 
brought under the attention of the youth again. Most of the terrorists had radicalised in France, 
something the authorities had to avoid. It was also a concern, considering reports coming in of 
many pupils not respecting the minute’s silence for those why died in the attacks. Therefore the 
government introduced a plan to boost the country’s secular values in schools. As part of this 
plan, ‘National Secularism Day’ was created, following the French tradition of laicity. Although 
the plan did not really work out, the wish of the authorities to follow this path can be linked to 
a serious lack of shared traditions, culture or overlap of values between (potential) terrorists 
and authorities (French Education Ministry, 24th of November 2016).  
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3.2.3 Counterterrorist measures mobilising the public 
One of the most comprehensible measures taken by the French authorities was the inauguration 
of the state of emergency in French, mere hours after the attacks. Even though such an act is 
very controversial considering the fact that it strips the basic rights of individuals, even the 
opposition parties in the French parliament backed this proposal. It offered the French 
counterterrorism officials many more tools to combat terrorism, such as carrying out raid on 
homes and putting suspects under house arrest without the regular preceding judicial procedures. 
Originally, the state of emergency would last 12 days, but it would be extended several times 
and only terminated in November 2017 (Le Figaro, 1st of November 2017). Although it touched 
upon many signifiers in the field of regular legislation, anti-terrorism legislation and popular 
mobilisation, its results can also be traced back to politicisation of the issue and a broader threat 
demarcation. 
Another measure taken by French government officials was the increased security in public 
transport. Although in general this measure was widely dismissed as a ‘security theatre’, due to 
its limited scope, the public transport was considered as a high priority target for terrorists. The 
authorities were therefore specifically trying to mobilise the public and involve them in 
counterterrorist measures (The Local, 19th of July 2016).  
Lastly, and possibly most spectacularly, as a result of the state of emergency and better 
cooperation with the Belgian intelligence agencies, French authorities managed to touch upon 
the last signifier De Graaf proposes. The initial escape  of Salah Abdeslam, the mastermind 
behind the Paris attacks, unleashed one of the biggest manhunts France had ever known. 
Abdesalam was eventually arrested in March 2016, five months after the events took place. 
Although his trial was supposed to be of major importance in the French news, his extradition 
from Belgium to France took a long time. Furthermore, Abdesalam decided to exercise his right 
to remain silent, and the first steps of his trial would take place behind closed doors. Therefore, 
one cannot speak of a spectacular show trial increasing performative power (Le Figaro, 18th of 
March 2016). Moreover, the trial and the eventual verdict cannot be included in our research, 
considering the six-month period this paper is investigating.  
3.3 Schematisation 
In conclusion, and as the scheme below clearly indicates, the performative power of the French 
government was extremely high in the months after the attacks in Paris. Twelve out of fourteen 
signifiers can be deemed present. The only signifiers to be absent are absent due to external 
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factors, which cannot be influenced by the French authorities, such as elections and a show trial 
of the mastermind behind the attacks.  
Performative Signifier Presence 
1. Was there more attention for counterterrorism, generated 
by political leaders personally and explicitly expressing 
themselves on the issues, rather than leaving it to lower 
level authorities? 
Yes (+1) 
2. Did counterterrorism become a central issue in electoral 
campaigns, or was it employed to demonise the political 
opponent? 
No (0) 
3. Did counterterrorism official feel themselves directly 
threatened, or was their perception of personal risk high? 
Yes (+1) 
4. Was the resonance of terrorist violence high, and was the 
public prepared to accept counterterrorism measures, ergo, 
was it a national priority over other issues? 
Yes (+1) 
5. Did the threat demarcation  become broader or more urgent 
than before? 
Yes  (+1) 
6. Was war rhetoric used, or did the tone of the discourse 
become more militant? 
Yes (+1) 
7. Did counterterrorism officials refer to historical 
experiences or existing / slumbering fears to invoke fear? 
Yes (+1) 
8. Was there an explicit refusal to talk to, or negotiate with, 
terrorists? 
Yes (+1) 
9. Was a serious lack of shared traditions, culture or overlap 
of values between the terrorists and authorities capitalising 
the mental distance? 
Yes (+1) 
10. Has the public been mobilised by the counterterrorism 
officials by directly involving them in counterterrorist 
measures? 
Yes (+1) 
11. Were any special units (usually used for a higher spectrum 
of violence than regular police) deployed as part of the 
counterterrorist measures? 
Yes (+1) 
12. Was any new anti-terrorism legislation introduced? Yes (+1) 
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13. Was any other new legislation introduced, potentially 
giving counterterrorism policy a supplementary boost? 
Yes (+1) 
14. Were any well-known individuals or entire groups tried by 






4 The Nice attacks 
Similarly to the previous section, this chapter will be a detailed case study of the terrorist attack 
that took place on the Bastille Day, July 14th, 2016. It will provide the reader with the basic 
knowledge about the events that day, as well as determine which measures French 
counterterrorist officials took in the six months after. Just like in the previous part, a 
schematisation will be provided at the end to analyse the degree of performative power. In this 
way, a comparison with the reaction of the French authorities after the 13th of November 2015 
attacks can be made in the next chapter.  
4.1 Line of events 
On July 14th, 2016, Bastille Day in France, tragedy struck again. At the Promenade des Anglais 
in Nice, the Tunesian-French Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel drove a 19 tonnes truck into a large 
crowd of partying people. Just after the fireworks at 10:30 p.m., Lajouaiej-Bouhlel bypassed 
the police barriers that were erected to barricade the promenade, by mounting the pavement and 
killing the first unsuspecting bystanders. After having driven more than two kilometres over a 
period of five minutes, security forces managed to kill the driver who initiated this carnage, 
after a short shoot-out. His act of terror left a trail of corpses and injured people. In total, eighty-
four people succumbed, and another three hundred were left injured. Lahouaiej-Bouhlel 
allegedly adhered to the Islamic State, and sought to punish France for participating in the 
coalition to destroy the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (Stonehem, 2016: 1-2). 
4.2 Analysis of counterterrorist measures 
The next section will discuss the most important measures taken by the French counterterrorism 
officials during the period following the terrorist attacks of July 14th, 2016. Just like in the 
previous chapter, the measures will not be written down chronologically, but divided into three 
groups.  
4.2.1. Counterterrorist measures politicising the threat 
Besides increased attention for counterterrorism, as I will describe below, it is important to 
highlight that just like after the Paris attacks international political attention became more 
important, forcing the French authorities not to leave it to lower level authorities. The 
international dimension was important, since half of the victims in the attack were foreigners. 
Therefore, international police organisation Interpol was forced to come in and help with the 
investigation, sending in special response teams to cooperate with the French authorities. Also, 
the former Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki Moon, expressed his deepest 
40 
 
sympathy and condolences to the victims, their families, and the government and people of 
France. His spokesman also stated: 
‘The Secretary General hopes that all those responsible for this massacre will be rapidly 
identified and brought to justice. He standards firmly by the French government and 
people as they confront this threat and stresses the need to intensify regional and 
international efforts to combat terrorism and violent extremism (United Nations, 15th of 
July 2016) .’  
By doing so, Ban Ki Moon took the attention for counterterrorism to the next level, both 
nationally and internationally. Something that did not only have to do with lower 
counterterrorism officials investigating and fighting terrorism, but also involving officials on 
state level. Hence, the international community managed to touch upon one of the signifiers, 
and not the national leaders. Something that we have to take into account when analysing the 
signifiers. Change does not necessarily have to come from the national authorities only in a 
more and more interconnected world.  
Considering the fact that the presidential and parliamentary election of May 2017 were still far 
away during the time of the attacks in Nice, one cannot say that the events can be included in 
this paper’s scope of research. The topic of terrorist would become an issue of the electoral 
campaign in the beginning of 2017. There was however one local candidate running for a seat 
in parliament for a different region, who suspended his campaign for the primary elections 
considering ‘the horror of Nice that struck our children […] in order to grieve for our losses’. 
Demonisation of political opponents over the issue would only take place later, mourning and 
grief were the main sentiments during the months after the events.  
When looking at the other two signifiers indicating the politicisation of the terrorist threat, one 
can that counterterrorism officials still felt themselves directly threatened, and their perception 
of personal risk was still high. Police officers were for example still carrying their guns off-
duty, as was permitted shortly after the Paris attacks. There are however no clear acts that 
indicate a further increase in this feeling of insecurity. Nevertheless, fear was still all around 
and this signifiers can therefore be deemed present. The same counts for the resonance of 
terrorist violence and the public being prepared to accept the measures being taken. 
Antiterrorism was simply a priority over a lot of other issues in France at that moment. There 
was some discussion about whether to prolong the state of emergency, since some parties in the 
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French parliament were doubting if the basic human rights of the French citizens were still 
being respected.  
4.2.2 Counterterrorist measures framing the threat 
Just like after the attacks in Paris, the Elysée had to give a declaration about the events in Nice. 
In the first instance, it looked like if the President was only condemning the attack and simply 
informing the people about the official investigation. One week after the events however, on 
the 22nd of July, president Hollande made an interesting move when it comes to the framing of 
the counterterrorist threat. Both the Islamic State and the assailants involved in the attacks in 
both Paris and Nice claimed to be conducting their acts of terror as a punishment for France in 
participating in the international coalition fighting the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Hollande 
did however decide to, as announced by his Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve, to provide 
the Iraqi army with several batteries of artillery to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq. They would 
be helped by an increased number of French military advisors. Moreover, Hollande announced, 
as a result of the Nice attack he would send the only French aircraft carrier the Charles de 
Gaulle’ to support the Iraqi army. ‘The goal…’, Hollande clarified, ‘… is to explain to the 
French citizens in a direct manner where and how we are putting efforts in the issue’(French 
Governmental Archives, 22nd of July 2016).3 A spokesperson of the Elysée later added:  
‘We are gathering all of our forces to show the French citizens a level of security in 
which they are able to live normally. The battle against terrorism is an absolute 
one(French Governmental Archives).’4 
In a speech a week after the attack, Hollande points out an even darker scenario: 
‘The current threat is of an even higher level. We have foiled an increasing number of 
attacks, without having needed to reveal them, simply since it seemed essential to 
apprehend the perpetrators and to ensure that they could not do any harm. The threat 
will however last. It does not only concerns France, many other countries are also 
victims. We must however defend ourselves, here, on our soil. To protect ourselves, we 
must eradicate terrorism both from the inside and the outside (French Governmental 
Archives, 26th of July, 2016).’5 
                                                            
3 It concerns a quotation which was translated by the author of this paper. 
4 It concerns a quotation which was translated by the author of this paper. 
5 It concerns a quotation which was translated by the author of this paper. 
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Just like after the Paris attacks, this type of speech act can be linked the three signifiers 
regarding counterterrorist measures framing the threat. War rhetoric was being used here and 
by sending troops to the Middle East, the debate certainly became more militant than before. 
Furthermore, by claiming the battle against terrorism is an ‘absolute’ one and by wanting to 
‘eradicate’ terrorism, Hollande does not show any mercy when it comes to the terrorists. 
Talking or negotiating does not seem to be an option anymore. Finally, the Elysée seems to be 
referring to historical experiences and existing fears when by stating that the government wants 
to show the French a new level of security, implying ordinary citizens were suffering from 
insecurity. Again, Hollande managed to touch upon several signifiers in order to reinforce 
performative power (French Governmental Archives, 22nd of July 2016). 
In the very same speech on the 22nd of July, the president also made a really clear statement 
indicating a serious lack of shared traditions, culture and overlap of values between the terrorists, 
capitalising the mental distance between them and the authority’s point of view: 
‘What is it the terrorists are looking for? They seek to frighten us and to disunite us, to 
separate us, to divide us in order to sow hatred and discord. Our unity and spirit are 
therefore essential if we want to stand up against this challenge. Similarly, the terrorists 
want us to give up our freedom, our rule of law, which puts us to a test in order to avoid 
discord and confrontation. We should not want stigmatisation of our views on religion, 
in this case the Islam, which has its place in our Republic. On the other hand, Islamism 
and fundamentalism are our enemies (French Presidential Press Office, 22nd of July 
2016).’6 
This speech held in front of the National Défense Council is clearly indicating that the president 
is focussing on any possible existing and slumbering fears in society too. Although Hollande 
points out that there is a huge mental distance between the ‘French values’, and resistance 
against Islamism and fundamentalism, he clearly embraces unity and the national spirit. A 
France where freedom, rule of law, and religion play an important role.  
4.2.3 Counterterrorist measures mobilising the public 
 
Moreover, two days after the attacks, the former Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve 
announced the mobilisation of 40,000 reservists to boost the presence of security forces in the 
streets and make the public feel more safe. Of these 40,000 troops, over 12,000 would be drawn 
                                                            
6 It concerns a quotation which was translated by the author of this paper. 
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from the regular Gendarmerie Nationale since, as Cazeneuve highlight, a fair share of the 
remaining reservists still had to be recruited from ‘all willing French patriots’. This measure 
taken by the Interior Ministry indicates a new presence of special units, that would usually be 
used for a higher spectrum of violence other than the regular police forces, as part of 
counterterrorist acts taken by the authorities. Moreover, it involved the public directly in 
counterterrorist measures, since Cazeneuve specifically asked the French people to sign up for 
service, thereby mobilising the public (French Interior Ministry, 19th of July 2016).  
Another measure that touched upon many of the signifiers, but mainly the ones under the 
mobilisation of the public, was the state of emergency. Although the state of emergency was 
already declared in the hours after the November 13th 2015 Paris attacks, on July 20th 2016 (a 
week after the Nice attack) the French parliament agreed on an extension of this measure for 
six more months. It gave way to further exceptional search and arrest power for the police forces, 
in other words the introduction of new legislation potentially giving counterterrorism policy a 
boost, and particularly introducing new anti-terrorism legislation. This was also done, 
considering the fact that the European Soccer Championship would take place in France in the 
weeks after. The Hollande government could not afford to be struck by a terrorist attack during 
such an international and open event. Moreover, the prolongation of the state of emergency put 
counterterrorism high on the agenda and made the threat demarcation become broader and more 
urgent, not to speak about the political results of this measures (French Presidential Press Office, 
15th of July 2016). 
Whereas in the case of the Paris attacks there was a clear mastermind being arrested, who could 
be put on a terrorism trial and reinforce performative power, this was not the case in Nice. The 
death of Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel probably even made it harder for the French authorities 
and society, since it made extra clear to them that these terrorists were willing to die for their 
cause.  
4.3 Schematisation 
In conclusion, just like in the previous chapter, the level of performatively is extremely high 
scoring twelve out of fourteen signifiers being present. Also, it appears that it concerns exactly 
the same signifiers for the same reasons. Again, elections were too far away to make 
counterterrorism a central issue in electoral campaigns, and again there was no show trial 
boosting performative power. This raises the question to what extent the context as well as the 
measures taken in the period of time after the Paris attacks might still influence performative 
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power after the Nice attacks. It looks like if certain counterterrorist measures did not have to be 
taken ‘again’, since France was already in a state of emergency, covering several signifiers.  
Performative Signifier Present? 
1. Was there more attention for counterterrorism, generated 
by political leaders personally and explicitly expressing 
themselves on the issues, rather than leaving it to lower 
level authorities? 
Yes ( +1) 
2. Did counterterrorism become a central issue in electoral 
campaigns, or was it employed to demonise the political 
opponent? 
No (0) 
3. Did counterterrorism official feel themselves directly 
threatened, or was their perception of personal risk high? 
Yes (+1) 
4. Was the resonance of terrorist violence high, and was the 
public prepared to accept counterterrorism measures, ergo, 
was it a national priority over other issues? 
Yes (+1) 
5. Did the threat demarcation  become broader or more urgent 
than before? 
Yes (+1) 
6. Was war rhetoric used, or did the tone of the discourse 
become more militant? 
Yes (+1) 
7. Did counterterrorism officials refer to historical 
experiences or existing / slumbering fears to invoke fear? 
Yes (+1) 
8. Was there an explicit refusal to talk to, or negotiate with, 
terrorists? 
Yes (+1) 
9. Was a serious lack of shared traditions, culture or overlap 
of values between the terrorists and authorities capitalising 
the mental distance? 
Yes (+1) 
10. Has the public been mobilised by the counterterrorism 
officials by directly involving them in counterterrorist 
measures? 
 Yes (+1) 
11. Were any special units (usually used for a higher spectrum 
of violence than regular police) deployed as part of the 
counterterrorist measures? 
Yes (+1) 
12. Was any new anti-terrorism legislation introduced? Yes (+1) 
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13. Was any other new legislation introduced, potentially 
giving counterterrorism policy a supplementary boost? 
Yes (+1) 
14. Were any well-known individuals or entire groups tried by 






5 The Paris and Nice attacks in perspective 
This section will dig into the results of the case studies investigated in the two chapters before, 
in order to discuss, interpret and put the outcomes in perspective. This is necessary, considering 
the fact that the case studies are obviously not exactly the same when it comes to their 
backgrounds (from both a historical and a contemporary point of view), and implications. 
Together with the theoretical background (namely: performative power theory as well as 
securitisation theory) which has been provided in earlier chapters, this part of the paper will 
attempt to illustrate the different circumstances of both attacks, and point out both parallels and 
differences, in order to create a better understanding of the use of De Graaf’s theory in the case 
studies used.  
The following sections will discuss the Paris and Nice attacks, analysing the level of 
performative power, and finishing by a brief description of the background of the specific 
terrorist attack.  These two parts will be followed by a more general subsection which will 
introduce some arguments that can be deducted from the comparison. 
5.1 Now and then: performativity in perspective 
First things first; following the results of applying De Graaf’s theory to the Paris attacks in 
November 2015, one can only conclude that there is a very high level of performative power in 
France in the aftermath of the events. Out of the fourteen possible present signifiers, twelve are 
clearly present. Extremely high, mainly due to measures such as the state of emergency and 
extra legislation as well as the mobilisation of both extra police and military reserves. Measures 
that have not been taken in other countries, although a treat keeps persisting in those countries 
too. None of those other countries has however experienced attacks on the scale as France 
experienced them during 2015 and 2016. 
Such high levels of performative power should though not be seen as exceptional, when looking 
at the phenomenon from a historical point of view. Just like other countries (as described in De 
Graaf’s work on which this paper is based), countries in Western Europe have been struggling 
with such high levels (or even higher, up to the maximum of fourteen signifiers present) of 
performativity. It mainly concerns the events of the 1960’s, 1970’s and 1980’s here, when 
(mainly) left-wing terrorist groups managed to boost levels in West Germany and Italy to 
similar heights (De Graaf, 2010: 136-137). Whereas those countries were not spared during 
those ‘red decades’, France had already had its fair share of political (if not ‘military’) terrorism 
during the beginning of the 1960’s. Performative power hit its highest peaks those years as a 
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result of the political clash between President Charles de Gaulle and the French army, fighting 
in French Algeria against the independence movement there. When De Gaulle decided to 
abandon Algeria as a French colony, big parts of the French military forces decided to turn 
against the president himself, hoping to ‘restore order’ in Paris. The military-drilled terrorists 
committed terrorist attacks against both civilians and politicians, killing over 2000 people from 
April 1961 to April 1962. As pointed out in prior research, performativity in those years was 
just as high as in 2015 and 2016, detecting the presence of about twelve signifiers (Smit, 2016: 
19). 
5.2 Background: differences and parallels 
In order to correctly compare the two case studies, one should take into account that the 
characteristics of attacks were often from a totally different nature. On the other hand, the 
assailants in both events could be linked to extreme thoughts and affiliations to Islamic terrorist 
groups such as Daesh, although affiliation with such groups is often only claimed by the groups 
themselves; not the terrorists. 
When it comes to the Paris terrorists, one can see a group of youngsters who grew up in Western 
Europe (either France or Belgium), radicalising in the very same region. It often concerned 
people who were described as ‘normal guys’, and integrated pretty well, since for example 
Abdeslam ran his own bar. Moreover, he and his friends were not reported as religious 
extremists, since they have been spotted drinking alcohol and smoking tobacco, forbidden 
according to Islamic rule. All of the assailants were radicalised in their home countries, and 
went to Syria to receive training by Daesh back in 2013 and 2014. The terrorists also knew each 
other, it was a group of brother, neighbours and friends who in some way grew up together. 
This made them very successful for multiple reasons. They trusted each other, and were able to 
keep their lines of communication short, and face-to-face. Despite and thanks to modern ways 
of communication they managed to keep below the radar when planning their large scale attack. 
This is the realm that modern day intelligence services can still not get a grasp on, making 
terrorist using these tactics more effective. With the help of their training in Syria, as well as 
radicalised elements in especially the Brussels’ black market environment, the group managed 
to prepare for the disastrous attack in Paris (Aydinli, 2015: 126). 
In the case of the Nice attack, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel was a so-called ‘lone wolf’, he was 
not part of some kind of terrorist cell under command of for instance Daesh like in Paris. It 
concerned a Tunesian-born Frenchman have had personal struggles. Although he was described 
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as a ‘weird loner’, had certain behavioural problems and was considered as ‘depressed’, Bouhlel 
was not on any terrorist watchlist according to the French authorities. According to interior 
minister Bernard Cazeneuve, Bouhlel started radicalising just three months before he 
committed his attack. Due to his ‘lone wolf’ behaviour, as well as his lack of affiliation with 
any known terrorist group, he remained the stay under the radar during the preparations for his 
act of terror. Moreover, he was not provided with the right training or equipment for committing 
such an attack, and decided to rely on quite ‘creative’ ways of attacking the public (Friedman, 
2016: Part III).  
5.3 Vicious circles 
Another interesting conclusion that can be drawn from the comparison of the two case studies, 
is the vicious circle when it comes to the level of performativity. The level of performativity 
after the Paris attacks, was just as high as after the Nice attacks, and it concerned exactly the 
same signifiers being present. This raises the question to what extent high levels of performative 
power can actually influence each other and prolong the effects. Moreover, one should consider 
what the effects of a high level of performativity on the long term are. As mentioned by De 
Graaf in her book, a high level of performativity can also simply trigger the terrorists, since to 
them it seems like if their reign of terror is ‘effective’ (De Graaf, 2011: 5).  
5.4 Validity of the theory: the changing nature of counterterrorism 
Although the case studies showed a lot of similarities when it comes to the goals and effects of 
the attacks on the French society and counterterrorist measures, the backgrounds of both events 
and their assailants have been very different. Despite the fact that these differences might not 
look very interesting to answering the research question, it actually can.  
As discussed before in the theoretical framework, De Graaf drew certain conclusions from her 
analysis and the functioning of performative power in general. She sees very strong correlations 
between high performativity when it comes to counterterrorism, as well as the activity of 
terrorist groups. Terrorist groups tend to become more active and aggressive when governments 
get more suppressive and public opinion changes. In the eyes of such movements, they get the 
impression their actions ‘do matter’ or ‘do make a change’ in society, stimulating to continue 
their campaign of terror (De Graaf, 2011: 5).  
I do however argue this correlation is out-of-date these days, and my reasons for doing so is 
two-fold. To begin with, one should consider the role of the lone wolves (such as Mohamed 
Lahouaiej-Bouhlel), undermining the idea of group behaviour and motivation when 
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performativity rises. Of course, individuals can also be committing attacks and get more 
exciting to continue when public opinion changes and performativity is one the rise. We should 
however not forget lone wolves do often not survive their acts of terror, or end up in jail. 
Furthermore, the same argument counts for organised groups of terrorists. Jihadi terrorist is 
often characterised by suicide attacks, as we have seen in this paper’s case studies too. If the 
assailants do not survive an act of terror, one cannot speak about a possible ‘sequel’ to the 











This thesis started with the question to what extent the theory of performative power as coined 
by Beatrice de Graaf is still applicable to contemporary cases of terrorism in Europe nowadays. 
After all, De Graaf developed her theory based on a comparative case study of terrorist 
movements in the 1960’s, 1970’s and  1980’s. She claims that her theory is universal in guiding 
performative power conducted by governments who are struggling with terrorist attacks. The 
world did however change since then, considering the rapid development of for instance means 
of communication or the change in types of terrorism. Hence, the author of this paper decided 
to select the November 13th 2015 and July 14th 2016 attacks in France to test her theory. After 
briefly reviewing the different chapters, a series of recommendations will be done and the 
applicability of De Graaf’s theory will be evaluated. 
Overview 
 
The literature review dug into the current position, definitions and theories of terrorism and 
counterterrorism studies in both the academic debate, and the practical application of policy by 
authorities. It makes the reader of this thesis familiar with the most dominant streams 
concerning the topic, such as the waves of terrorism (as coined by Rapoport) and the role of 
terrorism in these days, as well as the causes of current day terrorism. These could mainly be 
related to Muslin extremism, which has a spill over effect to Europe and the United States.  The 
chapter does however also show that there is broad range of approaches to the issue, 
subsequently leading to miscommunication and a lack of clarity when it comes to policy and 
definitions. Moreover, there is a broad debate on the limits to counterterrorism. Debates which 
are all of primordial importance to combat terrorism.  
The second section of the paper dug into the theoretical aspect of this research. After a brief 
introduction of the role of securitisation studies, one can argue that De Graaf’s theory can be 
seen as a complementing element to securitisation theory, since performative power concretely 
describes measures that can be taken, instead of describing the a process as securitisation theory 
does. Performative power theory does so by using a set of signifiers, developed to literally 
measures the level of government intervention in order to make the fear of the public for 
terrorist  attacks decline. It is this set of signifiers that are being used in the case studies selected. 
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The information for the case studies are mainly being drawn from open sources, just like De 
Graaf did for her own research.  
In the first case study, a high level of performative power was discovered. With a score of 12 
out of 14 signifiers being present, the period of time after the November 13th 2015 attacks in 
Paris are not an exception when it comes to times of terrorism. The cases investigated by De 
Graaf deal with the same levels of performativity. The same counts for the second case study, 
conducting research on the terrorist attacks in Nice on July 14th 2016, where 12 out of 14 
signifiers were present.  
Although De Graaf’s theory is offering a refreshing view on the way academia can offer 
counterterrorist officials help these days, this research made clear that there are still some 
bottlenecks in both methodological and theoretical implementation.  
Criticism 
 
When it comes to the methodological implementation, it should be noticed that performative 
power and the signifiers have their limitations timewise. As it seems, the effect of certain acts 
of counterterrorism can have different effects in different times, since the context is often totally 
different, limiting the usefulness of the theory on the long-term. De Graaf’s findings indicate 
that the performative power in West Germany under the Red Army Faction have been just as 
high as in France nowadays, although the death toll appears to be six times lower in the 1960’s 
and 1970’s. Moreover, it should be noticed that this theory can also be rendered less effective 
on the short-term. This paper for instance, focussed on the six-month period after both terrorist 
attacks. The measures taken after the first attack for example, are likely to influence 
performative power after the second attack. The state of emergency was still on its place in 
Nice, although it was instigated after the events in Paris. Therefore, it becomes harder to 
measures performativity, since there is a certain ‘threshold level’ still in place. One might even 
talk about some type of ‘vicious circle’, since a continuous series of measures might influence 
each other making single events have a spill-over effect long after counterterrorism measures 
were taken.  
Also, another flaw in performative power theory when it comes to the short-term, are its 
signifiers. A clear example is the presence of show trials or certain legislation. Often, like after 
the Paris attacks, it takes time to catch those responsible for the carnage (five months), and more 
than two years after the trial has not even started yet. Additionally, unlike some decades ago, 
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trials can take place behind closed doors. Another flaw when it comes to the short-term, is that 
it might take authorities longer than six months to instigate new legislation (such as the ‘Plan 
Vigipirate’) to respond to rising threat levels. Often it takes at least one year to do so, leading 
to ‘delayed performativity’.  
Yet another weakness that can be spotted when it comes to the signifiers, is the fact that some 
signifiers cannot be influenced at all by counterterrorism officials. A good example would be 
the role of elections. As described in both case studies, major elections in France would only 
take place in May 2017 (both presidential and parliamentary). Therefore, a signifier would 
automatically test absent, lowering the performativity of the authorities. Also, as the same 
signifier describes, one can ask to what extent it would be politically possible and correct to 
demonise the political opponent since the authorities have a certain responsibility in a country. 
By demonising political opponents, a government would not be acting against terrorists, but 
rather against political opponents. 
Another obstacle from a more methodological point of view can be spotted. De Graaf’s does 
not specifically mention which conditions have to be met to be able to say a signifier is ‘present’ 
or ‘absent’. Although the description of the signifiers is pretty clear, the conditions remain 
vague. Some measures might for example cover several signifiers, such as a state of emergency. 
On the other hand, one can also ask if some actions taken be counterterrorist officials can fully 
be considered as why a signifier is present or not. A good example would be the measures of 
the French authorities of arming police officers who are off-duty. This act could adhere to for 
example a higher perceived personal risk by counterterrorism officials who feel direct 
threatened. It could however also be seen as the introduction of new (anti-) terrorism legislation.  
De Graaf’s findings in practice 
As described in the theoretical framework of this paper, De Graaf claims her theory to be 
universal, when it comes to the correlation between the way in which counterterrorism measures 
interact with performative power by the authorities. The two conclusions she draws based on 
her case studies are as follows. Firstly, she states that a higher number of casualties (both 
deceased and wounded) boosts performative power. The authorities are simply more willing to 
take draconic measures if there is more suffering. Secondly, she noticed that this causal 
relationship does not always hold true, since it might also trigger further violence and prolong 
the conflict (e.g. waves of terrorist attacks).  
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When having a look at the case studies discussed in this paper, it is not very hard to prove the 
first of De Graaf’s conclusions to be true. Although this research does not provide the level of 
performative power in the period of time before the Paris attacks, one can clearly see that the 
increased number of anti-terrorism measures taken shortly after November 13th 2015 made 
performative levels go through the roof. When it comes to the second conclusion De Graaf 
draws in her research, it is much harder to prove her finding right. This can partially be related 
to one of the flaws of the theory, as discussed above: both short-term research does not benefit 
this theory. The short period of time did not offer the authorities the luxury of lowering their 
performative power, meaning that the other explanation (namely; less attacks due to declining 
performativity) could not be tested. Another explanation of why a lower level of performative 
power could make the number of terrorist attacks decline, as a result of effective 
counterterrorism measures, could also hardly be tested on the short-term. Firstly it concerns a 
lack of manpower and instruments, which is certainly not case in France considering the large 
number of extraordinary forces being mobilised. Secondly, efforts to decrease radicalisation 
among youngsters who might potentially be willing to commit violent attacks. Although a Day 
of Solidarity was organised in French schools, true deradicalisation programmes have not been 
set up yet.  
Lastly, one should realise the very nature of terrorist acts has changed over the past decades. 
The fourth (or religious) wave of terrorism is characterised by the high number of lone wolves 
and suicide attacks. As explained in the previous chapter of this paper, these characteristics do 
clash with De Graaf’s conclusions on the correlation between when it comes to rising 
performativity being the reason for further peaks in terrorist attacks, simply because there would 
not be anyone left after the first attack. 
In sum, the second part of De Graaf’s own conclusions (drawn from her theory) are very hard 
to apply on other case studies. The theory listens to a very limited scope of cases, and even than 
it might be hard to prove. Again, as mentioned above too, short-term usage of this theory does 
not render it very useful since many signifiers are simply eliminated by it. The only conclusion 
to be proven correct is the most obvious one: a high number of casualties will automatically 
lead to a high level of performative power in counterterrorism.  
Suggestions 
Besides signifiers being vague or overlapping each other, thereby blurring the differences 
between them, one can also speak about missing signifiers. A signifier that was maybe less 
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significant when we are talking about the period of time that De Graaf has been doing research 
on. As mentioned in the introduction, times change, and globalisation and the 
internationalisation of terrorism might pose a serious risk to the usefulness of De Graaf’s theory. 
In the opinion of the author of this paper, the international dimension of this theory is lacking. 
As the case study on Paris clearly indicates, French and Belgian authorities have clearly failed 
to cooperate although the suspects were already on their ‘radar’. The willingness of both the 
Belgian Prime Minister and the French President at that point can partially adhere to the first 
signifier on political attention on the level of the state leader.  
International attention for terrorism can however also improve performative power, considering 
the fact that terrorism prevention did indeed increase after the Paris attacks. Moreover, 
declarations by foreign heads of states or leaders of international organisation (such as Interpol, 
the EU or the United Nations) can also contribute to an increased sense of security. More 
measures could, and should be taken in an international context to win hearts and minds of the 
European (including the French) people, making the international political context more 
important to the signifiers, something that is currently lacking. As Bureš mentioned before, 
international counterterrorism policy should not remain a ‘paper tiger’, indicating the 
importance of proper policymaking. In this respect, the signifiers deployed by De Graaf in order 
to measure performative power in her study, cannot automatically be applied to contemporary 
cases of terrorism considering the new internationalised dimension. 
Verdict 
 
Although De Graaf claims her theory on performative power (arising from ‘ticking the boxes’ 
of signifiers) to be universal, I do not fully agree with this view. On the one hand, as can be 
seen above, De Graaf’s perception of performative power is fully built on a series of signifiers 
that are partially vague or outdated.  
A good example of a signifier that should altered is the one on the use of counterterrorism in 
electoral campaigns or the demonisation of political opponents. As described above, elections 
times are not always close, meaning that this signifier cannot always be present, lowering 
performativity in some cases, leading to an unfair judgement. A good way to obviate this 
problem, is by looking better at intermediate election polls or other types of surveys among the 
public to measure the effectiveness of counterterrorist measures. 
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Another signifier that causes problems when it comes to its usefulness would be the one on 
major terrorism trials. Whereas this signifier might have been useful in the past, privacy has 
become more of an issue these days, not allowing the public to influenced by it. Moreover, the 
rise of suicide terrorism makes public trials less feasible. This issue could easily be avoided by 
deleted it from the list of signifiers considering the fact that, although it might still remain 
relevant, it is simply not possible to analyse anymore. 
Therefore, any extension studies on this subject should focus on clarifying the criteria and 
boundaries of the signifiers. This is especially important since time limitations do not benefit 
the usefulness of the theory. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that De Graaf’s theory 
provides a toolkit and at least some guidance when it comes to the analysis of counterterrorist 
measures. Also, her conclusions when it comes to both the causality and sometimes the lack of 
causality between performative power and the number of terrorist attacks. Moreover, it should 
be noticed that the general conclusions De Graaf has drawn are still valid. It should also, after 
all, not be forgotten that performativity together with the fourteen signifiers for the first time 
managed to merge several fields of studies and to make the influence of terrorism and 
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